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github.com/langflow-ai/langflow

@ 873d5585929f

Submitted 8/4/2026, 10:25:52 AM · Status: ok

Risk grade
F
100 / 100
Findings
773
5 critical138 high586 medium43 low1 info0 on CISA KEV0ATT&CK
Showing 773 of 773 findings

Findings

  • ChromaDB Python project has a pre-authentication code injection vulnerability
    grypeCVE-2026-45829EPSS 12.4%
  • shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values
    grypeCVE-2026-9277EPSS 0.9%
  • websocket-driver: Message corruption via abuse of protocol length headers
    grypeCVE-2026-54466EPSS 0.3%
  • shell-quote: shell-quote: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unescaped line terminators
    shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line te…
    trivyCVE-2026-9277
  • websocket-driver is a WebSocket protocol handler with pluggable I/O. P ...
    websocket-driver is a WebSocket protocol handler with pluggable I/O. Prior to 0.7.5, the frame format in draft versions of the WebSocket protocol includes a length header that allows an arbitrarily large integer to be encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set. By sendi…
    trivyCVE-2026-54466
  • @actions/download-artifact has an Arbitrary File Write via artifact extraction
    grype
  • @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs generates arbitrary code when compiling malicious input
    grypeCVE-2026-44728EPSS 0.1%
  • brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups
    grypeCVE-2026-13149EPSS 0.3%
  • brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash
    grypeCVE-2026-14257EPSS 0.3%
  • fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via failed IDN canonicalization
    grypeCVE-2026-13676EPSS 0.4%
  • fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via literal backslash authority delimiter
    grypeCVE-2026-16221EPSS 0.2%
  • fast-uri vulnerable to host confusion via percent-encoded authority delimiters
    grypeCVE-2026-6322EPSS 0.5%
  • fast-uri vulnerable to path traversal via percent-encoded dot segments
    grypeCVE-2026-6321EPSS 0.5%
  • fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278)
    grypeCVE-2026-33036EPSS 0.6%
  • Forge has a basicConstraints bypass in its certificate chain verification (RFC 5280 violation)
    grypeCVE-2026-33896EPSS 0.4%
  • Forge has Denial of Service via Infinite Loop in BigInteger.modInverse() with Zero Input
    grypeCVE-2026-33891EPSS 0.6%
  • Forge has signature forgery in Ed25519 due to missing S > L check
    grypeCVE-2026-33895EPSS 0.5%
  • Forge has signature forgery in RSA-PKCS due to ASN.1 extra field
    grypeCVE-2026-33894EPSS 0.5%
  • js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption
    grypeCVE-2026-59869EPSS 0.4%
  • js-yaml: YAML merge-key chains can force quadratic CPU consumption
    grypeCVE-2026-59869EPSS 0.4%
  • lodash vulnerable to Code Injection via `_.template` imports key names
    grypeCVE-2026-4800EPSS 2.6%
  • minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern
    grypeCVE-2026-26996EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern
    grypeCVE-2026-26996EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern
    grypeCVE-2026-26996EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has a ReDoS via repeated wildcards with non-matching literal in pattern
    grypeCVE-2026-26996EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
    grypeCVE-2026-27903EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
    grypeCVE-2026-27903EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
    grypeCVE-2026-27903EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments
    grypeCVE-2026-27903EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions
    grypeCVE-2026-27904EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions
    grypeCVE-2026-27904EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions
    grypeCVE-2026-27904EPSS 0.5%
  • minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions
    grypeCVE-2026-27904EPSS 0.5%
  • path-to-regexp vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service via multiple route parameters
    grypeCVE-2026-4867EPSS 0.5%
  • PostCSS: Arbitrary file read and information disclosure via attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL in CSS comments
    grypeCVE-2026-45623EPSS 0.5%
  • PostCSS: Arbitrary file read and information disclosure via attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL in CSS comments
    grypeCVE-2026-45623EPSS 0.5%
  • PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure
    grype
  • PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure
    grype
  • Serialize JavaScript is Vulnerable to RCE via RegExp.flags and Date.prototype.toISOString()
    grype
  • shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)
    grypeCVE-2026-13311EPSS 0.4%
  • SVGO DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (Billion Laughs)
    grypeCVE-2026-29074EPSS 0.6%
  • SVGO removeScripts plugin leaves some executable scripts intact
    grype
  • Undici has Unbounded Memory Consumption in WebSocket permessage-deflate Decompression
    grypeCVE-2026-1526EPSS 1.1%
  • Undici has Unhandled Exception in WebSocket Client Due to Invalid server_max_window_bits Validation
    grypeCVE-2026-2229EPSS 0.9%
  • undici WebSocket client vulnerable to denial of service via fragment count bypass
    grypeCVE-2026-12151EPSS 0.8%
  • Undici: Malicious WebSocket 64-bit length overflows parser and crashes the client
    grypeCVE-2026-1528EPSS 0.5%
  • ws: Memory exhaustion DoS from tiny fragments and data chunks
    grypeCVE-2026-48779EPSS 0.8%
  • ws: Memory exhaustion DoS from tiny fragments and data chunks
    grypeCVE-2026-48779EPSS 0.8%
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:102
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:111
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:155
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:164
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:271
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/de.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/en.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/es.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/fr.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/ja.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/pt.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/locales/zh-Hans.json:4608
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/bundles/lfx-bundles/src/lfx_bundles/mongodb/mongodb_atlas.py:30
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/bundles/lfx-bundles/src/lfx_bundles/mongodb/mongodb_atlas.py:108
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/docs/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:603
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/docs/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:612
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/docs/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:695
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:102
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:111
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:155
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:164
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:271
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.11.0/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:600
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.11.0/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:609
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.11.0/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:692
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:102
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:111
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:155
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:164
  • Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret st
    Committed PEM private-key material (a "-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----" block). Anyone with repo read access holds the key: rotate it, remove it from history, and load keys at runtime from a secret store / mounted volume instead. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:271
  • Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, a
    Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, and inject tokens at runtime. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.9.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:24
  • Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, a
    Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, and inject tokens at runtime. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/docs/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:555
  • Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, a
    Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, and inject tokens at runtime. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.10.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:24
  • Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, a
    Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, and inject tokens at runtime. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.11.0/Develop/api-keys-and-authentication.mdx:552
  • Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, a
    Hardcoded JSON Web Token (a "eyJ...eyJ...sig" literal). A committed JWT is a live bearer credential until it expires — anyone with repo read access can replay it. Remove it, rotate/revoke the token, and inject tokens at runtime. (First-party socbox rule; Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepdocs/versioned_docs/version-1.8.0/Develop/jwt-authentication.mdx:24
  • pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/services/cache/service.py:114
  • pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/backend/base/langflow/services/cache/service.py:437
  • pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    pickle.load/loads on non-constant data executes arbitrary code on deserialize. Use JSON or a signed/whitelisted format for untrusted input. (Apache-2.0.)
    semgrepsrc/lfx/src/lfx/services/cache/service.py:69
  • 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
    'apt-get' install should use '--no-install-recommends' to minimize image size.
    trivysrc/frontend/dev.Dockerfile:5
  • 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
    'apt-get' install should use '--no-install-recommends' to minimize image size.
    trivysrc/frontend/cdk.Dockerfile:5
  • 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
    'apt-get' install should use '--no-install-recommends' to minimize image size.
    trivy.devcontainer/Dockerfile:10
  • 'dnf clean all' missing
    Cached package data should be cleaned after installation to reduce image size.
    trivysrc/lfx/docker/Dockerfile:62
  • 'dnf clean all' missing
    Cached package data should be cleaned after installation to reduce image size.
    trivysrc/lfx/docker/Dockerfile:17
  • 'microdnf clean all' missing
    Cached package data should be cleaned after installation to reduce image size.
    trivysrc/lfx/docker/Dockerfile:62
  • 'microdnf clean all' missing
    Cached package data should be cleaned after installation to reduce image size.
    trivysrc/lfx/docker/Dockerfile:17
  • Babel is a compiler for writing next generation JavaScript. From 7.12. ...
    Babel is a compiler for writing next generation JavaScript. From 7.12.0 to before 7.29.4 and 8.0.0-alpha.13, using Babel to compile code that was specifically crafted by an attacker can cause Babel to generate output code that executes arbitrary code. This vulnerability is fixed …
    trivyCVE-2026-44728
  • brace-expansion through 5.0.7 is vulnerable to denial of service via m ...
    brace-expansion through 5.0.7 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The expand() function limits the number of results with a max option (default 100,000) but does not bound the length of each result string. By chaining multiple brace groups, an attacker keeps…
    trivyCVE-2026-14257
  • brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity
    brace-expansion through 5.0.6 is vulnerable to denial of service. The expand() function exhibits exponential-time complexity in the number of consecutive non-expanding '{}' brace groups. An attacker who passes a crafted string to expand(), directly or transitively, can cause sign…
    trivyCVE-2026-13149
  • fast-uri: fast-uri: Path traversal vulnerability allows bypass of security policies
    fast-uri decoded percent-encoded path separators and dot segments before applying dot-segment removal in its normalize() and equal() functions. Encoded path data was treated like real slashes and parent-directory references, so distinct URIs could collapse onto the same normalize…
    trivyCVE-2026-6321
  • fast-uri: fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to improper Unicode hostname canonicalization
    fast-uri versions 2.3.1 through 3.1.2 and 4.0.0 fail to canonicalize Unicode (IDN) hostnames for HTTP-family URLs. The IDN conversion path calls a helper that does not exist on the global URL constructor, silently leaving the host in its original Unicode form while normalize() an…
    trivyCVE-2026-13676
  • fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling
    fast-uri normalize() decoded percent-encoded authority delimiters inside the host component and then re-emitted them as raw delimiters during serialization. A host that combined an allowed domain, an encoded at-sign, and a different domain was re-emitted with the at-sign as a raw…
    trivyCVE-2026-6322
  • fast-xml-parser: fast-xml-parser: Denial of Service via XML entity expansion bypass
    fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expa…
    trivyCVE-2026-33036
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivysrc/lfx/docker/Dockerfile.dev:6
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker_example/pre.Dockerfile:0
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker_example/Dockerfile:0
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker/render.pre-release.Dockerfile:0
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker/render.Dockerfile:0
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker/frontend/build_and_push_frontend.Dockerfile:0
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker/dev.Dockerfile:3
  • Image user should not be 'root'
    Running containers with 'root' user can lead to a container escape situation. It is a best practice to run containers as non-root users, which can be done by adding a 'USER' statement to the Dockerfile.
    trivydocker/cdk.Dockerfile:2
  • Impact: fast-uri versions from 2.3.1 through 4.1.0 (including the 3.x ...
    Impact: fast-uri versions from 2.3.1 through 4.1.0 (including the 3.x line up to 3.1.3 and the 2.x line up to 2.4.2) do not treat a literal backslash character (U+005C) as an authority delimiter. Node's native WHATWG URL parser, used by fetch, undici, and Node's http and https cl…
    trivyCVE-2026-16221
  • js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service via crafted YAML documents
    js-yaml is a JavaScript YAML parser and dumper. From 3.0.0 before 3.15.0 and from 4.0.0 before 4.3.0, js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly when a chain of mappings uses merge keys where each mapping merges the previous one. This i…
    trivyCVE-2026-59869
  • js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service via crafted YAML documents
    js-yaml is a JavaScript YAML parser and dumper. From 3.0.0 before 3.15.0 and from 4.0.0 before 4.3.0, js-yaml can spend quadratic CPU time parsing a document whose size grows only linearly when a chain of mappings uses merge keys where each mapping merges the previous one. This i…
    trivyCVE-2026-59869
  • lodash: lodash: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input in template imports
    Impact: The fix for CVE-2021-23337 (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the variable option in _.template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink. When an a…
    trivyCVE-2026-4800
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service due to unbounded recursive backtracking via crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-a…
    trivyCVE-2026-27903
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service due to unbounded recursive backtracking via crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-a…
    trivyCVE-2026-27903
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service due to unbounded recursive backtracking via crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-a…
    trivyCVE-2026-27903
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service due to unbounded recursive backtracking via crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-a…
    trivyCVE-2026-27903
  • minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), wh…
    trivyCVE-2026-27904
  • minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), wh…
    trivyCVE-2026-27904
  • minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), wh…
    trivyCVE-2026-27904
  • minimatch: Minimatch: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking in glob expressions
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), wh…
    trivyCVE-2026-27904
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal charact…
    trivyCVE-2026-26996
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal charact…
    trivyCVE-2026-26996
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal charact…
    trivyCVE-2026-26996
  • minimatch: minimatch: Denial of Service via specially crafted glob patterns
    minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal charact…
    trivyCVE-2026-26996
  • node-forge: Forge (node-forge): Certificate validation bypass allows unauthorized certificate issuance
    Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, `pki.verifyCertificateChain()` does not enforce RFC 5280 basicConstraints requirements when an intermediate certificate lacks both the `basicConstraints`…
    trivyCVE-2026-33896
  • node-forge: Forge: Authentication bypass via forged Ed25519 cryptographic signatures
    Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, Ed25519 signature verification accepts forged non-canonical signatures where the scalar S is not reduced modulo the group order (`S >= L`). A valid signa…
    trivyCVE-2026-33895
  • node-forge: Forge: Signature Forgery via Weak RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Verification
    Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification accepts forged signatures for low public exponent keys (e=3). Attackers can forge signatures by stuffing “garba…
    trivyCVE-2026-33894
  • node-forge: node-forge: Denial of Service via infinite loop in BigInteger.modInverse()
    Forge (also called `node-forge`) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to version 1.4.0, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the node-forge library due to an infinite loop in the BigInteger.modInverse() function (inherited from …
    trivyCVE-2026-33891
  • path-to-regexp: path-to-regexp: Denial of Service via catastrophic backtracking from malformed URL parameters
    Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambigu…
    trivyCVE-2026-4867
  • PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure
    ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `lib/previous-map.js` **Line**: 87-98 (`loadFile`), 129-144 (`loadMap`) ### Root Cause PostCSS auto-detects a `/*# sourceMappingURL=... */` comment inside the CSS text it is asked to parse and, unless the caller explicitly passes `map: false`…
    trivy
  • PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure
    ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `lib/previous-map.js` **Line**: 87-98 (`loadFile`), 129-144 (`loadMap`) ### Root Cause PostCSS auto-detects a `/*# sourceMappingURL=... */` comment inside the CSS text it is asked to parse and, unless the caller explicitly passes `map: false`…
    trivy
  • postcss: PostCSS: Information disclosure and denial of service via crafted CSS input
    PostCSS takes a CSS file and provides an API to analyze and modify its rules by transforming the rules into an Abstract Syntax Tree. In versions 8.5.11 and prior, the PreviousMap parses the /*# sourceMappingURL=PATH */ comment from any CSS string passed to process() and dereferen…
    trivyCVE-2026-45623
  • postcss: PostCSS: Information disclosure and denial of service via crafted CSS input
    PostCSS takes a CSS file and provides an API to analyze and modify its rules by transforming the rules into an Abstract Syntax Tree. In versions 8.5.11 and prior, the PreviousMap parses the /*# sourceMappingURL=PATH */ comment from any CSS string passed to process() and dereferen…
    trivyCVE-2026-45623
  • Serialize JavaScript is Vulnerable to RCE via RegExp.flags and Date.prototype.toISOString()
    ### Impact The serialize-javascript npm package (versions <= 7.0.2) contains a code injection vulnerability. It is an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-7660. While `RegExp.source` is sanitized, `RegExp.flags` is interpolated directly into the generated output without escaping. A simi…
    trivy
  • shell-quote: shell-quote/parse: shell-quote: Denial of Service due to inefficient input parsing
    shell-quote prior to 1.8.5 finalizes parsed tokens in parse() using Array.prototype.concat as a reduce accumulator, which reallocates and copies the entire growing array on every iteration. As a result parse() runs in O(n^2) time relative to the number of input tokens. An attacke…
    trivyCVE-2026-13311
  • SVGO removeScripts plugin leaves some executable scripts intact
    ### Summary SVGO's removeScripts plugin (disabled by default) removes scripts from the SVG, however executable scripts were left intact in some cases. If a consumer relied on this plugin for sanitization and served them to users, these SVGs could open up doors to XSS. ### Detai…
    trivy
  • svgo: SVGO: Denial of Service via XML entity expansion
    SVGO, short for SVG Optimizer, is a Node.js library and command-line application for optimizing SVG files. From version 2.1.0 to before version 2.8.1, from version 3.0.0 to before version 3.3.3, and before version 4.0.1, SVGO accepts XML with custom entities, without guards again…
    trivyCVE-2026-29074
  • undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames
    Impact: The undici WebSocket client enforces maxPayloadSize on the cumulative byte count of fragments in a message but does not enforce a limit on the number of fragments. A malicious WebSocket server can stream many small or empty continuation frames that each pass per-frame and…
    trivyCVE-2026-12151
  • undici: undici: Denial of Service via crafted WebSocket frame with large length
    ImpactA server can reply with a WebSocket frame using the 64-bit length form and an extremely large length. undici's ByteParser overflows internal math, ends up in an invalid state, and throws a fatal TypeError that terminates the process. Patches Patched in the undici version …
    trivyCVE-2026-1528
  • undici: Undici: Denial of Service via invalid WebSocket permessage-deflate extension parameter
    ImpactThe undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack due to improper validation of the server_max_window_bits parameter in the permessage-deflate extension. When a WebSocket client connects to a server, it automatically advertises support for permessage-d…
    trivyCVE-2026-2229
  • undici: undici: Denial of Service via unbounded memory consumption during WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression
    The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without en…
    trivyCVE-2026-1526
  • ws: ws: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from small WebSocket fragments
    ws is an open source WebSocket client and server for Node.js. All versions from 1.1.0 up to (but not including) 5.2.5, from 6.0.0 up to 6.2.4, from 7.0.0 up to 7.5.11, and from 8.0.0 up to 8.21.0 are affected by a memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability. A peer can send a high volume…
    trivyCVE-2026-48779
  • ws: ws: Denial of Service via memory exhaustion from small WebSocket fragments
    ws is an open source WebSocket client and server for Node.js. All versions from 1.1.0 up to (but not including) 5.2.5, from 6.0.0 up to 6.2.4, from 7.0.0 up to 7.5.11, and from 8.0.0 up to 8.21.0 are affected by a memory exhaustion DoS vulnerability. A peer can send a high volume…
    trivyCVE-2026-48779

This report is public.